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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal decisions concerning the size of the sample
and the price of the paid content for online publishers of digital information
goods when sampling serves the dual purpose of disclosing content quality
and generating advertising revenue. We show in a reduced-form model
how the publisher’s optimal ratio of advertising revenue to sales revenue
is linked to characteristics of both the content market and the advertising
market. Assuming that consumers learn about content quality from the
free samples in a Bayesian fashion, we find that it can be optimal for the
publisher to generate advertising revenue by offering free samples even
when sampling reduces high prior expectations and content demand. In
addition, we show that it can be optimal for the publisher to refrain from
revealing quality through free samples when advertising effectiveness is
low and content quality is high.
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1 Introduction
Digital information goods have now been available on the Internet for almost
twenty years. During that time, publishers have developed different business
models to distribute content. Some publishers provide all their information for
free, and some charge consumers for access to their content. Other publishers
employ a hybrid business model and give away a portion of their content to
consumers for free and charge for access to the rest of their content. The reason
for employing such a hybrid strategy is twofold: Offering free samples allows
the publishers to both disclose their content quality and to generate revenues
from advertisements shown to online visitors. According to Alisa Bowen, gen-
eral manager of The Wall Street Journal Digital Network, “working with advertis-
ers to offer open houses has proven to be one of the most valuable and efficient
ways to expose our premium content to new readers and potential subscribers”
(GlobeNewswire, 2012). The main contribution of this paper is to provide a for-
mal analysis of how publishers should choose between the different business
models and make decisions on size of the sample and on price of the paid con-
tent.
Recently, hybrid business models where publishers set the size of the sample
and consumers select the samples of their choice have emerged.1 For example,
The Daily, a subscription based digital news publication created for Apple’s iPad,
offers seven issues for free. Likewise, the New York Times and the Minneapolis-
based StarTribune currently offer access, respectively, to ten and twenty articles
for free on its website each month.2 Such advertising supported “random sam-
pling” is also employed by distributors of music such as Spotify or Rhapsody.
Allowing consumers to choose for themselves which content to sample creates
randomness for publishers in that they have no control over the content con-
sumers actually sample. Taking this into account is important for publishers to
set the optimal sample size.
Digital information goods are particularly suitable for sampling because the
costs of providing free samples are negligible and it is relatively easy to limit
access to free content. In addition, sampling digital information goods allows
the publisher to include advertisements in the free samples. These features dis-
1An alternative approach to sampling is where the firm chooses not only the number of
free sample articles but also the sample content itself (see, for instance, www.wsj.com). This of
course allows the firm to strategically manipulate the sample and creates an environment where
customers are likely to discount the sample quality in estimating actual quality.
2See Chiou and Tucker (2011) for a survey of different types of “paywalls” that separate free
content from paid content.
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tinguish sampling of information goods from other products such as perishable
goods or durable goods. The business model where publishers set a sample size
and let the consumers choose which content to sample differs from versioning
or “freemium,” where a basic version of the content is offered to consumers for
free and access to the full version is restricted to those who pay for the content.3
Irrespective of the specific good, sampling aims at shifting the demand function
outwards. However, offering free samples may also cannibalize the demand for
the product.
This paper develops an analytical model to study optimal decisions concern-
ing the size of the sample and the price of the paid content for online publishers
of digital information goods when sampling serves the dual purpose of disclos-
ing content quality and generating revenues from advertising. The publisher is
assumed to receive revenues from both selling content and from selling adver-
tisements, which are included in the free content. Consumers have prior expec-
tations about content quality, which they update in a Bayesian fashion through
inspection of the free samples. The information transmitted through samples
affects the consumers’ posterior expectations about content quality, which in
turn influences demand for the paid content (content demand). Taking the con-
sumers’ quality updating into account, the publisher faces a tradeoff between
an expansion effect (through learning) and a cannibalization effect (through free
offerings) on content demand induced by sampling. When the publisher makes
its sampling and pricing decisions, it takes both these two countervailing effects
on content demand and the effects on the advertising revenue into account. We
assume that the publisher can either adopt a “sampling strategy,” a “paid con-
tent strategy,” or a “free content strategy.”
We derive the following main results. First, we show in a reduced-form
model how the publisher’s optimal ratio of advertising revenue to sales revenue
is determined by characteristics of both the content market and the advertis-
ing market. Specifically, the key determinants of the advertising-sales revenue
ratio are the elasticities of expected content demand with respect to price and
sample size, the price elasticity of advertising demand, and the elasticity of con-
sumers’ updated expectations with respect to the sample size. The latter plays
a crucial role in the determination of the ratio of advertising to sales revenue:
When expectations are increasing in sample size, the ratio tends to be lower,
whereas it tends to be higher if expectations are decreasing in sample size. This
last result follows because an increase in expectations mitigates or even com-
3Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) analyze optimal versioning of information goods.
3
pensates for the cannibalization effect, thus leading to a lower advertising-sales
revenue ratio. If instead sampling reduces expectations, offering free samples
reinforces the cannibalization effect, which in turn leads to a higher ratio of ad-
vertising revenue to sales revenue. Nevertheless, the publisher will engage in
ad-supported sampling if the advertising price per impression is high enough.
Second, we characterize the publisher’s optimal sample size and price de-
cisions in a benchmark model where content quality is common knowledge.
The optimal strategy is determined by the relationship between the advertising
effectiveness and content quality. In addition, a paid content strategy is opti-
mal for the publisher only if the effectiveness of advertising is sufficiently low.
For intermediate levels of the advertising effectiveness, the publisher should
employ a sampling strategy and generate revenues from both sales and adver-
tising. Once advertising is sufficiently effective, the publisher should switch to
a free content strategy. Thus, it may be optimal for the publisher to offer free
content samples even if sampling cannibalizes content demand.
Third, we characterize the publisher’s optimal sample size and price deci-
sions when consumers learn about content quality through inspection of the
free samples. Assuming that consumers are uncertain about content quality, we
find that sampling has a demand-enhancing effect when the elasticity of con-
sumer’s posterior expectations with respect to sample size exceeds the ratio of
sampled to paid content. The optimal strategy is determined by the relationship
between the advertising effectiveness and the interplay between prior expecta-
tions and actual content quality. As in the benchmark model, employing a paid
content strategy is optimal only if the advertising effectiveness is sufficiently
low, a sampling strategy is optimal for intermediate levels of the advertising
effectiveness, and the publisher should switch to a free content strategy once
advertising is sufficiently effective.
Our paper is related to two literature streams. The first stream is on media
firm strategy in two-sided markets.4 For instance, Kind et al. (2009) analyze how
competition, captured by the number of media platforms and content differen-
tiation between platforms, affects the composition of revenues from advertising
and sales. Godes et al. (2009) investigate a similar question, but focuses on com-
petition between platforms in different media industries. Our paper examines
optimal advertising supported content sampling and content pricing when the
firm can choose to be financed by content sales, advertising, or both. The mod-
4See Rysman (2009) for a general review of the two-sided markets literature. Anderson and
Gabszewicz (2006) provide a canonical survey of media and advertising.
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els with competition by Godes et al. (2009) and Kind et al. (2009) are not suitable
for this analysis, because they use a framework where the media firms always
charge for their content and where readers purchase from every media firm
(multi-homing). Papers that examine content sampling from different perspec-
tives include Xiang and Soberman (2011) for preview provision and Chellappa
and Shivendu (2005) for piracy-mitigating strategies, but they do not consider
the impact of sampling on advertising revenues. To the best of our knowledge,
optimal content sampling when sampling impacts revenues from both content
sales and online advertising has not been addressed by the literature.
This paper is also related to the broad literature on consumer learning about
product attributes. Firms often enable consumer learning through disclosing
information about their products and services. Information can be disclosed in
various ways; for instance, through informative advertising (see Anderson and
Renault 2006, and Bagwell 2007 for a comprehensive survey). Sun (2011) and
Hotz and Xiao (forthcoming) consider information disclosure through product
descriptions or third-party reviews. Another common way for firms to disclose
information is through sampling. The distinctive feature of product samples
is that they allow consumers to have actual experience with the good before
purchase.5 Heiman et al. (2001) and Bawa and Shoemaker (2004) study how
sample promotions affect demand and the evolution of market shares for con-
sumer goods. While free sample promotions for consumer goods are “expen-
sive,” Boom (2009) and Wang and Zhang (2009) argue that sampling informa-
tion goods is essentially “for free.” However, when firms sample information
goods, they only offer a portion of the good for free to avoid the “information
paradox” (Akerlof, 1970).6 The consumers’ inference from this portion about
the product’s attributes is most naturally modeled in a Bayesian framework.
Bayesian learning processes based on product experience have been widely
employed in the literature, for instance, by Erdem and Keane (1996), Acker-
berg (2003), and Erdem et al. (2008), and we follow this approach here.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the
general framework. Section 3 describes the model and the consumer’s learning
mechanism in particular. Section 4 characterizes optimal sampling and pricing
5In most cases, consumers experience the product only after purchase. See Villas-Boas (2004)
and Kopalle and Lehmann (2006) for cases where consumers’ first-period experience influences
their second-period choice.
6Samples of information goods typically come in the form of demo or light versions (soft-
ware), abstracts (academic publishing), previews (books and movies), or simply “samples”
(music). For an analysis of software sampling see, for instance, Fauge`re and Tayi (2007) and
Cheng and Tang (2010).
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decisions when consumers know content quality. Section 5 extends the analysis
to the case of incomplete information and assumes that quality is initially the
publisher’s private information. Conclusions and directions for future research
are offered in Section 6. To facilitate the exposition, we have relegated the proofs
to the Appendix.
2 General Framework
Consider a publisher who offers a digital information good with content of size
N > 0 through an online channel. Content size may be thought of as the number
of chapters of a book or movie, the number of songs on an album, or the number
of articles on a news platform. The publisher has constant unit costs c ≥ 0
and fixed costs F ≥ 0 to produce the content.7 The costs of providing free
samples are normalized to zero. We assume that the publisher has two decision
variables: the sample size n ∈ [0, N ] and the price p at which to sell the good.
We consider a market with a unit measure of consumers that observe the
publisher’s sampling and pricing decisions. However, consumers are uncertain
about content quality. We assume that they update their prior expectations in
a Bayesian fashion through inspection of the free samples and denote by V˜ (n)
the consumers’ posterior expectations about content quality. The demand for
unsampled content depends on price p, sample size n, and V˜ (n). Specifically,
we assume that the publisher’s expected content demand is given by
DE(p, n) ≡ D(p, n, V˜ (n)). (1)
This representation emphasizes that the sample size has both a direct effect on
content demand and an indirect effect that operates through the impact of n on
posterior quality expectations V˜ (n).
We assume that content demand satisfies the following basic assumptions.
First, we assume that ∂D
∂p
< 0, i.e. content demand depends negatively on price.
Second, we impose that ∂D
∂n
< 0, so that a larger sample size has a direct negative
effect on demand for the remaining content. Third, we require that ∂D
∂V˜
> 0, i.e.
content demand depends positively on (posterior) quality. The overall effect of
the sample size n on expected content demand is given by
∂DE
∂n
=
∂D
∂n
+
∂D
∂V˜
V˜ ′(n),
7Throughout the analysis, we assume that the fixed cost do not exceed the optimized profits.
Hence they do not change the analysis and can therefore be omitted.
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where term ∂D
∂V˜
V˜ ′(n) captures the indirect effect of the samples size on expected
content demand. It is not clear a priori how the sample size affects posterior
expectations, which clearly affects ∂D
E
∂n
. If V˜ ′(n) < 0, sampling reduces posterior
expectations and is thus demand-reducing. Note that even if V˜ ′(n) > 0, that is,
if sampling increases posterior expectations, offering an additional sample may
be demand-reducing if direct effect dominates the indirect effect. Once V˜ ′(n)
is sufficiently large, the indirect effect is stronger than the direct effect so that
∂DE
∂n
> 0 and thus sampling has a demand-enhancing effect. In line with Bawa
and Shoemaker (2004), we refer to the direct effect of sampling on content de-
mand as the “cannibalization effect” and to the indirect effect as the “expansion
effect.”
The publisher receives revenues from two sources: selling paid content and
including advertisements in the free samples. Specifically, we assume that each
of the free samples comes with an advertisement. A representative advertiser
delivers the n advertisements to the publisher at a price per impression, which is
denoted by a(n). The price for advertisements is assumed to decrease in sample
size, so that a′(n) < 0. When offering n free samples, the publisher’s advertising
revenues are given by a(n)n.
The publisher makes pricing and sampling decisions so as to maximize its
profits from the two sources of revenue:
max
p,n
π(p, n) = (p− c)D(p, n; V˜ (n)) + a(n)n (2)
s.t. p ≥ 0
0 ≤ n ≤ N .
Assuming that the publisher’s profit function π(p, n) is concave and noting that
the constraint set is convex, standard optimization theory posits that there is a
unique constraint global maximizer (p∗, n∗). Depending on the optimal pricing
and sampling decision, the following definition gives the strategies available to
the publisher.
Definition 1 (Strategies). Given the optimal pricing and sampling decision (p∗, n∗),
the publisher adopts either (i) a “sampling strategy” if p∗ > 0 and n∗ ∈ (0, N), (ii) a
“paid content strategy” if p∗ > 0 and n∗ = 0, or (iii) a “free content strategy” if p∗ = 0
and n∗ = N .
Notice that both the paid content strategy and the free content strategy are
nested within the sampling strategy. The publisher will thus receive no adver-
tising revenue under a paid content strategy and no sales revenue under a free
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content strategy. The following result describes the optimal ratio of advertising
revenue to sales revenue.
Proposition 1 (Advertising-Sales Revenue Ratio). When the publisher chooses the
sample size and the price optimally, its ratio of advertising revenue to sales revenue is
given by
an∗
Dp∗
=
ηn − ηV˜ εV˜
(1− 1
ηa
)ηp
, (3)
where ηp ≡ −(∂D/∂p)(p/D) denotes the elasticity of content demand with respect to
price, ηn ≡ −(∂D/∂n)(n/D) denotes the elasticity of content demand with respect to
sample size, ηV˜ ≡ (∂D/∂V˜ )(V˜ /D) denotes the elasticity of content demand demand
with respect to quality, εV˜ ≡ V˜ ′(n)(n/V˜ ) denotes the elasticity of posterior quality with
respect to sample size, and ηa ≡ −n′(a)(a/n) denotes the price elasticity of advertising
demand.
This result is proved in the Appendix (as are the subsequent ones). It has two
important managerial insights: First, it shows that the publisher’s advertising-
sales revenue ratio is determined by characteristics of both the content market
and the advertising market. Specifically, the elasticities of content demand with
respect to price, sample size, and quality, the price elasticity of advertising de-
mand, and the elasticity of posterior expectations with respect to sample size
jointly determine the optimal advertising-sales revenue ratio. This general re-
sult thus provides guidance for managers seeking to better understand the con-
tributions of sales and advertising to total revenue.
Second, Proposition 1 shows how changes in the “market environment,”
captured by the various elasticities, will affect the composition of revenues.
Unsurprisingly, if ηp increases, the advertising-sales revenue ratio is lower. In-
tuitively, for a given sample size, the optimal price for the content is lower,
which results in a higher content demand.8 In contrast, a higher elasticity of
content demand with respect to the sample size ηn increases the advertising-
sales revenue ratio because sampling results in a stronger cannibalization ef-
fect. Furthermore, a higher price elasticity of advertising demand ηa reduces
the advertising-sales revenue ratio as the price per impression is lower.
Proposition 1 also highlights the crucial role which the elasticity of poste-
rior expectations with respect to sample size plays in the determination of the
advertising-sales revenue ratio. While the elasticity of content with respect to
8Alternatively, for a given price, a higher ηp reduces the demand for the paid content, which
results in a lower sample size, which in turn reduces advertising revenues.
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quality ηV˜ is always positive, the impact of sampling on posterior quality deter-
mines the sign of ηV˜ εV˜ . Thus, if εV˜ is negative, the ratio of advertising revenue
to sales revenue tends to be high, while it tends to be low if εV˜ is positive. In-
tuitively, if εV˜ < 0, sampling reduces expected content demand as V˜
′(n) < 0,
and hence the advertising-sales revenue ratio is high. In contrast, if εV˜ > 0,
sampling increases expected content demand as consumer revise their expecta-
tions about quality upwards, which in turn results in a lower advertising-sales
revenue ratio.
Interestingly, the optimal advertising-sales revenue ratio is reminiscent of
the Dorfman-Steiner condition, which states that a monopolist’s ratio of adver-
tising spending to sales revenue is equal to the ratio of the elasticities of demand
with respect to advertising and price (Dorfman and Steiner, 1954). Proposition 1
reduces to this result in the special case when offering additional samples does
not affect posterior quality (εV˜ = 0) and if the advertising demand is perfectly
elastic (ηa → ∞).
Our general framework is agnostic about how consumers form posterior
expectations. To shed light on how sampling determines posterior quality ex-
pectations and in turn expected content demand, the next section introduces a
Bayesian learning mechanism in which consumers update their prior expecta-
tions about content quality through their sample experience. In order to gener-
ate more insights, we use specific functional forms for content and advertising
demand.
3 Model
This section introduces the elements of our model. We begin by laying out
the assumptions regarding the publisher and the advertiser. We then describe
the consumers’ learning process about content quality. Finally we lay out the
timeline of the model.
3.1 The Publisher
Suppose that the publisher offers an information good with N ∈ IN content
parts. The qualities of the n ∈ IN0 free samples are uniformly distributed on the
quality spectrum [0, V¯ ] and are labeled V1, . . . , Vn. We assume that the publisher
has private information about V¯ and normalize both the marginal costs c of
producing content and the costs of providing free samples to zero. We treat the
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quality spectrum as an outcome of a previous strategic decision and focus on
the publisher’s short-run pricing and sampling decisions.
3.2 The Advertiser
Assume that there is a representative advertiser (e.g., an advertising agency)
that places product advertisements in the free samples offered by the publisher.
The benefit to the advertiser from running n advertisements is given by
u(n) = φn− 1
2N
n2,
where φ is a positive number. Letting a denote the price per impression charged
by the publisher, the advertiser’s overall cost of running the n advertisements
are given by a(n)n. The advertiser’s willingness to pay for an advertisement is
derived from equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of placing an
advertisement and is given by
a(n) = φ− n
N
.
This inverse demand function for placing advertisements slopes downward,
implying that the publisher’s value per ad impression is decreasing in sample
size. We impose the regularity condition φ > 1 to ensure that the publisher faces
a positive willingness to pay for advertisements under a free content strategy.
Notice that φ has the interpretation of the maximum willingness to pay for plac-
ing an advertisement. Following Godes et al. (2009), we will refer to φ as “ad-
vertising effectiveness.” Intuitively, φ can be thought of as a parameter shifting
the inverse demand function “outwards.”
3.3 Consumers
Consumers know that the qualities of the content parts are uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, V¯ ]. However, they do not know the upper bound V¯ of the
publisher’s quality spectrum and are hence uncertain about (average) content
quality.9 Consumers have a common prior belief about V¯ that may stem, for in-
stance, from reviews, ratings or “word of mouth.” The natural conjugate family
for a representative random sample from a uniform distribution with unknown
upper bound is the Pareto distribution (DeGroot, 1970). We capture uncertainty
9Note that the upper bound V¯ is monotonically related to the mean, which may be an alter-
native way for consumers to think about content quality.
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Figure 1: Prior expectations about V¯ (where V¯ ≡ 1).
about V¯ by a prior belief that consists of a minimum estimate v¯0 of the upper
bound V¯ and a level of uncertainty α about this value. Specifically, we assume
that the prior belief follows a Pareto distribution with density function
f(v¯|v¯0, α) =
⎧⎨
⎩
αv¯α0
v¯α+1
, for v¯ > v¯0
0, otherwise.
We assume that α > 1 to ensure existence of the prior expectations.10 Further,
we assume that the consumers’ prior parameters v¯0 and α are common knowl-
edge.11 Based on the consumers’ prior knowledge about v¯0 and α, their prior
expectation about V¯ is
E[V¯ |v¯0, α] = αv¯0
α− 1 . (4)
Obviously, prior expectations increase in v¯0 and decrease in α. Figure 1 illus-
trates prior expectations along with the corresponding expectations for different
parameter values. Prior expectations are lower than actual quality in Panel A
and higher than actual quality in Panel B. Notice, however, that prior expecta-
tions can be higher than actual quality even if v¯0 < V¯ .
Consumers update their prior belief about V¯ by taking the observed quali-
ties of the free content pieces into account. Specifically, consumers evaluate the
n sample qualities Vi = vi (i = 1, . . . , n) to form their posterior beliefs v˜(n) about
10Our measure of uncertainty corresponds to the scale parameter α of the Pareto distribution.
Hence, when the uncertainty is higher, the prior distribution is more spread out.
11For instance, the publisher can learn about prior expectations employing standard market
research techniques such as surveys.
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quality V¯ . Using standard Bayesian analysis, v˜(n) follows a Pareto distribution
with minimum value parameter v˜0(n) = max{v¯0, v1, . . . , vn} and shape param-
eter α + n (De Groot, 1970).12 Hence, the posterior expectation of V¯ is given
by
E[V¯ |v˜0(n), α] = (α + n)v˜0(n)
α + n− 1 .
Consumers infer the expected quality of the information good E[V |v1, . . . , vn]
from posterior expectations and knowing that qualities are uniformly distributed
on the quality spectrum offered. Therefore their expected quality of the infor-
mation good is given by
E[V |v1, . . . , vn] = E[V¯ |v˜0(n), α]
2
. (5)
Consumers agree that higher quality is better than lower quality but differ
in the way they value quality. To capture this heterogeneity, we introduce a
preference parameter for quality θ, which is uniformly distributed on the in-
terval [0,1]. We consider discrete choice and assume that consumers have unit
demand for the content: Each consumer either purchases the information good
at price p or stays with the n free samples. A consumer’s (indirect) utility from
these two options is given by
u(p, n) =
⎧⎨
⎩Nθ E[V |v1, . . . , vn]− p, from purchasing at price pnθE[V |v1, . . . , vn], from staying with the free samples. (6)
This specification assumes that consumers are neutral about advertisements
and neither find them a nuisance nor appreciate them. In effect, this means
they can skip over them (or mechanically screen them out) at essentially zero
cost.
3.4 Timeline
The publisher first decides on the sample size n and the price p at which to sell
the information good. Next, consumers select the samples of their choice and
use the observed sample qualities V1 = v1, . . . , Vn = vn to update their prior
expectations about content quality V¯ . Finally, consumers decide whether or not
to purchase the information good based on posterior expectations.
12The proof of this result is reproduced in the Appendix.
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4 Strategy with Known Quality
We first analyze as a benchmark the case in which the consumers know V¯ and
hence the publisher’s quality spectrum. In this setting, sampling does not af-
fect the consumers’ expectations about quality and simply serves to generating
advertising revenues. We derive content demand for each strategy and then
characterize the optimal strategy.
4.1 Content Demand
We first derive content demand under a sampling strategy and subsequently
the demands for the two boundary strategies.
Sampling Strategy. When consumers know the upper bound V¯ of the quality
spectrum, they expect content quality to be equal to E[V ] = V¯
2
. When the pub-
lisher employs the sampling strategy, consumers get some of the content for free
but have to purchase the information good if they want to obtain the full con-
tent. Based on the preferences in (6), a consumer will purchase if and only if her
indirect utility from buying it exceeds her indirect utility from consuming the
free samples only. Specifically, if θ(N−n) V¯
2
−p ≥ 0, the consumer purchases the
product. This condition has the interpretation that the utility of the content that
has not been sampled must exceed the price. Recalling that θ follows a uniform
distribution on [0, 1], content demand can be expressed as
D(p, n) = Pr
{
θ ≥ p
(N − n) V¯
2
}
= max
{
0, 1− p
(N − n) V¯
2
}
. (7)
This demand function has the intuitive properties that it decreases in price p
and increases in average quality V¯
2
. Moreover, sampling has a direct negative
effect on content demand as ∂D
∂n
< 0. Intuitively, this follows because a larger
sample size reduces the utility of the content consumers have to pay for.
Paid Content Strategy. When the publisher employs the paid content strategy,
setting n = 0 in (7) produces
D(p, 0) = max
{
0, 1− p
N V¯
2
}
. (8)
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Free Content Strategy. When the publisher employs a free content strategy,
consumers never purchase the information good as they can download it for
free. We thus have that D(p,N) ≡ 0.
4.2 Optimal Pricing and Sampling
The publisher’s chooses its pricing and sampling decision so as to
max
p,n
π(p, n) = p
(
1− p
(N − n) V¯
2
)
+
(
φ− n
N
)
n
s.t. p ≥ 0
0 ≤ n ≤ N .
From the first-order conditions, the (best-response) price for a given sample size
can be derived as
p(n) =
(N − n)V¯
4
. (9)
This implies an inverse relationship between sample size and price: The more
free samples the publisher chooses to offer, the less he will be able to charge the
consumer for the (remaining) content. The next result summarizes the optimal
pricing and sampling decisions for each of the three strategies.
Lemma 1 (Pricing and Sampling). Suppose that the upper bound of content quality
V¯ is common knowledge. Then, (i) under a sampling strategy, p∗ = NV¯ (8(2 − φ) +
V¯ )/64 and n∗ = N(8φ − V¯ )/16, (ii) under a paid content strategy, p∗ = NV¯ /4 and
n∗ = 0, and (iii) under free content strategy, p∗ = 0 and n∗ = N .
The parameters V¯ and φ have opposite effects on the optimal price and on
the optimal sample size under a sampling strategy: As we can expect, p∗ in-
creases in V¯ while n∗ decreases in the highest quality. In contrast, p∗ decreases
in φ, and n∗ increases in advertising effectiveness. Furthermore, both the opti-
mal price and the optimal sample size increase in content size N .
The main objective in what follows is to characterize the publisher’s optimal
strategy. As a first step, we compare the two boundary strategies to understand
under which conditions each of them yields a higher profit.
Lemma 2 (Boundary Strategies). Suppose that the upper bound of content quality
V¯ is common knowledge. Then, the publisher attains a higher profit under a free content
strategy than a paid content strategy if and only if φ > V¯
8
+ 1.
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Figure 2: Optimal strategy with known quality.
The condition in Lemma 2 shows that the choice between the two bound-
ary strategies depends simply on the relationship between the quality V¯ and
the advertising effectiveness φ. As long as advertising effectiveness is low, the
publisher should employ a paid content strategy. Instead, if advertising effec-
tiveness exceeds the threshold level V¯
8
+1, the publisher should switch to a free
content strategy and offer its content for free. Next, we characterize the pub-
lisher’s optimal strategy.
Proposition 2 (Optimal Strategy). Suppose that the consumers know the quality
spectrum. Then, (i) if φ ∈ ( V¯
8
, V¯
8
+2), the publisher should employ a sampling strategy,
(ii) if φ ≤ V¯
8
, the publisher should follow a paid content strategy, and (iii) if φ ≥ V¯
8
+2,
the publisher’s optimal strategy is to use a free content strategy.
Proposition 2 shows that the choice of the optimal strategy is solely driven
by the relationship between content quality V¯ and advertising effectiveness φ.
Thus, a paid content strategy is optimal if the effectiveness of advertising is
sufficiently low. For intermediate levels of advertising effectiveness, a sampling
strategy that generates revenues from both sales and advertising is optimal.
Once advertising is sufficiently effective, the publisher should switch to a free
content strategy. Figure 2 illustrates the optimal strategy for given parameters
values φ and V¯ along with the profits for each strategy (which are π∗SC for the
sampling strategy, π∗PC for the paid content strategy, and π
∗
FC for the free content
strategy).13
13The parameter values underlying the figure are V¯ = 10 and N = 10. Qualitatively, the
choice of specific parameter values does not affect Figure 2.
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The effects of φ and V¯ on the optimal strategy can also be understood by
inspection of the advertising-sales revenue ratio. The ratio follows from (3) and
is
an∗
Dp∗
=
(φ− V¯
8
)( V¯
8
+ φ)
V¯
4
( V¯
8
+ 2− φ) .
The ratio of advertising revenue to sales revenue tends to zero as φ approaches
the lower bound V¯
8
, implying that the publisher should employ a paid content
strategy. Also, a sampling strategy is optimal only if advertising is not “too
effective,” that is, as long as φ ≤ V¯
8
+ 2. Once φ exceed this threshold level, the
publisher should switch to a free content strategy.
4.3 Summing up
When content quality is common knowledge, the publisher’s optimal strategy
is determined by the relation between the advertising effectiveness and con-
tent quality. The more effective advertising is, the more free samples the pub-
lisher should offer—even though it solely cannibalizes content demand. In the
next section, we study optimal pricing and sampling decisions when the qual-
ity spectrum is not known to consumers and they learn about quality through
inspection of the free samples.
5 Strategy with Unknown Quality
We now focus on a setting in which V¯ and hence the product spectrum is not
known to consumers. In this setting, sampling not only serves the purpose of
generating advertising revenues but is employed to influence the consumers’
expectations about quality. As in the benchmark model, we first derive content
demand for each strategy and then characterize the optimal sampling strategy.
5.1 Content Demand
We first derive content demand under a sampling strategy and subsequently
derive the demands for the two boundary strategies.
Sampling Strategy. When consumers do not know the upper bound of the qual-
ity spectrum V¯ with certainty, content demand is influenced by the consumers’
posterior quality expectations. However, when the publisher makes decisions
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about the sample size and the price, it has to base them on expected content de-
mand as consumers have not yet evaluated sample qualities and updated their
expectations about content quality.
Calculating expected content demand involves a two-step procedure. In a
first step, the publisher computes the expected posterior quality by averaging
posterior expectations about V¯ as given in (5) across all possible realizations of
sample qualities:
E [E[V |V1, . . . , Vn]] = (α+ n)E [v˜0(n)]
2 (α + n− 1) .
In a second step, the publisher substitutes the expected posterior quality into
the indirect utility function given in (6) to obtain expected content demand:
DE(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− p
(N − n)
2 (α + n− 1)
(α + n)E [v˜0(n)]
}
. (10)
Next, we calculate E [v˜0(n)] and insert it into the expected content demand given
in (10). The following lemma summarizes the result.
Lemma 3 (Expected Demand). When the publisher sells the information good at
price p and offers n ∈ {1, N − 1} samples, then
(a) if v¯0 < V¯ , expected content demand is given by
DE{v¯0<V¯ }(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− p
(N − n)
2 (α + n− 1) (n+ 1)V¯ n
(α+ n)
(
v¯n+10 + nV¯
n+1
)
}
. (11)
(b) if v¯0 ≥ V¯ , expected content demand is given by
DE{v¯0≥V¯ }(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− p
(N − n)
2 (α + n− 1)
(α + n) v¯0
}
. (12)
These demand functions have the intuitive properties that they decrease in
price p and increase in expected posterior quality. However, sampling has both
a direct demand-reducing effect and an indirect effect that operates through its
impact on posterior expectations. The direct effect kicks in through the factor
1
N−n and mirrors the cannibalization effect
∂D
∂n
< 0 in our reduced-form model.
Paid Content Strategy. When the publisher employs the paid content strategy,
consumers cannot update their quality expectations. Setting n = 0 in (10) and
rearranging produces
DE(p, 0) = max
{
0, 1− p
N αv¯0
2(α−1)
}
. (13)
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This demand function is a close cousin of the corresponding demand for paid
content given in (8) when consumers know quality. The difference is that the
expected content demand is driven by prior expectations about V¯ rather than
expected quality V¯
2
itself.
Free Content Strategy. When the publisher employs a free content strategy,
consumers never purchase the information good as they can download it for
free. Thus, DE(p,N) ≡ 0.
5.2 The Role of Quality Expectations
For a given level of prior expectations about content quality, sampling either in-
creases or decreases expected content demand. Whether or not sampling com-
pensates for the cannibalization effect through consumers’ learning depends on
the gap between posterior quality and actual quality. To investigate the quality
gap, we define expected posterior quality as
V˜ (n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(α + n)
(
v¯n+10 + nV¯
n+1
)
2 (α + n− 1) (n + 1)V¯ n , if v¯0 < V¯
(α + n) v¯0
2 (α + n− 1) , if v¯0 ≥ V¯ .
(14)
With this definition in mind, we define the quality gap as V˜ (n)− V¯
2
. Consumers
overestimate (underestimate) quality if the expected posterior quality is higher
(lower) than actual quality. This leads to the following result.
Lemma 4 (Quality Gap). When v¯0 < V¯ , consumers underestimate quality if
v¯0
V¯
<
(
α− 1
α + n
) 1
n+1
, (15)
and overestimate it if the inequality is reversed. If v¯0 ≥ V¯ , consumers overestimate
quality irrespective of the sample size and their level of uncertainty α > 1.
For the case where v¯0 < V¯ , Figure 3 illustrates the set of prior parameters
for which consumers overestimate and underestimate quality, respectively. The
figure also illustrates that the set of prior parameters for which consumers un-
derestimate quality increases as n gets larger. This can perhaps best be seen by
noting that V˜ (n) → V¯
2
as n → ∞, meaning that consumers learn actual quality
once the sample size gets “large enough.”
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Figure 3: The quality gap for the case v0 < V¯ (where V¯ ≡ 10). The shaded area
indicates where consumers underestimate quality.
The definition of V˜ (n) allows us to rewrite the expected content demands
derived in Lemma 3 more compactly as
DE(p, n) = max
{
0, 1− p
(N − n)V˜ (n)
}
. (16)
Notice that this demand function is a specific form of the reduced-form demand
function in Equation (1). In it the number of free samples n has both a direct
effect on expected content demand and an indirect effect that operates through
posterior quality expectations V˜ (n). The next result uses this demand function
to identify conditions under which sampling has a demand-enhancing effect
(that is, ∂D
E
∂n
> 0).
Lemma 5 (Effects of Sampling). Offering free samples has a demand-enhancing
effect if εV˜ >
n
N−n , that is, if the elasticity of consumers’ posterior expectations exceeds
the ratio of sampled to paid content.
Lemma 5 shows that offering free samples may increase expected content
demand through consumers’ learning, even though it produces a cannibaliza-
tion effect. Intuitively, the indirect effect dominates the direct cannibalization
effect if sampling induces a sufficiently large upwards revision of consumers’
prior expectations.
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5.3 Optimal Strategy
The publisher’s makes its pricing and sampling decisions so as to
max
p,n
πE(p, n) = p
(
1− p
(N − n)V˜ (n)
)
+
(
φ− n
N
)
n
s.t. p ≥ 0
0 ≤ n ≤ N .
Comparing expected profits to the profits when content quality is known to
consumers shows that the only difference is the dependence on expected pos-
terior quality rather than actual (average) quality. Based on comparison to (9)
and recalling that V˜ (n) is the posterior estimate of average quality V¯
2
, we thus
obtain that
p(n) =
(N − n)V˜ (n)
2
.
Substituting p(n) back into the profit function allows us to rewrite the profit
maximization problem more conveniently as
max
n
πE(n) = (N − n) V˜ (n)
4
+
(
φ− n
N
)
n (17)
s.t. 0 ≤ n ≤ N .
As in the benchmark model, we first investigate the conditions under which
each of the boundary strategies yields a higher profit. The next result shows
when a paid content strategy is more profitable than a free content strategy.
Lemma 6 (Boundary Strategies). Given that content quality V¯ is not known to
consumers, the optimal pricing and sampling decisions are, respectively, p∗ = Nαv¯0
4(α−1)
and n∗ = 0 under a paid content strategy and p∗ = 0 and n∗ = N under a free
content strategy. Consequently, the publisher attains a higher profit under a free content
strategy than under a paid content strategy if and only if φ > αv¯0
8(α−1) + 1.
This result shows that when prior expectations are correct in the sense that
they are equal to V¯
2
, the condition under which the paid content strategy is more
profitable than the free content strategy is the same as in the benchmark model
with known quality (see Lemma 2). When consumers’ prior expectations are
“too high,” φ must be higher in order to support a free content strategy. The
reason is that higher quality expectations translate into a higher demand un-
der a paid content strategy, and hence higher profits due to demand-markup
complementarities (Athey and Schmutzler, 2001).
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Figure 4: Optimal strategy with unknown quality.
To determine the publisher’s optimal strategy, we now also consider the
sampling strategy. In contrast to our benchmark model, it is not possible to
characterize the optimal pricing and sampling decisions (and hence profits) an-
alytically. Nevertheless, we can derive the following result.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Strategy). Suppose that consumers are uncertain about V¯
and that the profit function πE(n) is strictly concave. Then, there are cut-off values
φ = 1
4
(V˜ (0)−NV˜ ′(0)) and φ = 2 + V˜ (N)
4
such that a sampling strategy is optimal for
φ ∈ (φ, φ), a paid content strategy is optimal for φ ≤ φ, and a free content strategy is
optimal for φ ≥ φ.
This proposition is consistent with the insights from the benchmark model
that a paid content strategy is optimal only if the advertising effectiveness is suf-
ficiently low, that a sampling strategy is optimal for intermediate levels of the
advertising effectiveness, and that the publisher should switch to a free content
strategy once advertising is sufficiently effective (see Proposition 2).14 Figure 4
illustrates the optimal strategy for varying φ and the expected profits for each
strategy (which are πESC for the sampling strategy, π
∗
PC for the paid content strat-
egy, and π∗FC for the free content strategy).
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Proposition 3 reveals that prior expectations determine the lower of the two
cut-off values whereas posterior expectations for sample size n = N determine
14Observe that we assume in Proposition 3 that the profit function πE(n) is globally concave.
However, there are parameter constellations for which this assumption is not satisfied. In this
case, the cut-off values must be determined numerically by the comparing profits that arise
from the different strategies.
15The parameter values underlying the figure are v¯0 = 5, α = 2, V¯ = 10, and N = 10.
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Figure 5: Optimal strategy for different parameter values.
the upper cut-off value. In effect, φ is determined by the impact of the “first
sample” on posterior expectations, while φ is determined by posterior expec-
tations after inspection of the “last sample.” The next lemma shows that the
model where quality V¯ is not known to consumers nests the full information
benchmark model (see Proposition 2).
Lemma 7 (Cut-off Values). Suppose that consumers are uncertain about content
quality V¯ and that the profit function πE(n) is strictly concave. Then, when consumers
have correct quality expectations, that is, if v¯0 = V¯ and α → ∞, the lower bound φ
converges to V¯
8
and the upper bound φ converges to V¯
8
+ 2.
We next explore the comparative statics effect of changes in the consumers’s
prior parameters on the optimal strategy. Proposition 3 shows that the optimal
strategy depends not only on advertising effectiveness φ and quality V¯ as in
the benchmark model, but also on the specific values of the prior parameters
v¯0 and α (as well as content size N). Figure 5 illustrates the comparative statics
effects of changes in the consumers’ prior parameters.16 Panel A depicts the cut-
off thresholds between the different strategies in the (v¯0, φ)-space (given α =
2). Similarly, Panel B illustrates the optimal choice of strategy in the (α, φ)-
space (given v¯0 = 5). Notice that prior expectations are correct and coincide
with actual quality when v¯0 = 5 and α = 2 (see Equation 4). The following
observation summarizes our insights.
16The figure uses the normalizations V¯ = 10 and N = 10.
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Observation 1 (Comparative Statics). Suppose that consumers are uncertain about
quality V¯ . Then, (a) when both the prior quality expectations and the advertising effec-
tiveness are low, the publisher should employ a sampling strategy to reveal his higher
than expected quality, (b) when prior expectations increase, that is, either v¯0 increases
or α decreases, the publisher should switch to a paid content strategy, and (c) when the
advertising effectiveness φ increases, the publisher should adopt a free content strategy.
5.4 Summing Up
When content quality is the publisher’s private information, sampling has a
demand-enhancing effect when the elasticity of consumer’s posterior expecta-
tions with respect to sample size exceeds the ratio of sampled to paid content.
When this condition is not satisfied, sampling mitigates or reinforces the canni-
balization effect. As in the benchmark model, we show that employing a paid
content strategy is optimal only if advertising effectiveness is sufficiently low,
that a sampling strategy is optimal for intermediate levels of advertising effec-
tiveness, and that the publisher should switch to a free content strategy once
advertising is sufficiently effective.
6 Summary and Implications
This paper has analyzed optimal decisions concerning the size of the sample
and the price of the paid content for online publishers of digital information
goods when sampling serves the dual purpose of disclosing content quality and
generating advertising revenue. One of the key features of the analytical model
is that consumers evaluate free samples of their choice within the limit set by the
publisher. Consumers then use the information transmitted in the free samples
to update their prior expectations about content quality in a Bayesian fashion to
make more informed purchase decisions. Taking the consumers’ quality updat-
ing into account, the publisher can either adopt a “sampling strategy,” a “paid
content strategy,” or a “free content strategy.”
We derived the following three key results. First, the publisher’s optimal
ratio of advertising revenue to sales revenue is determined by the elasticities of
expected content demand with respect to price and sample size, the price elas-
ticity of advertising demand, and the elasticity of consumers’ updated expecta-
tions with respect to the sample size. Second, when content quality is known to
consumers, the optimal strategy is determined by the relationship between ad-
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vertising effectiveness and content quality. Interestingly, we found that it may
be optimal for the publisher to offer free content samples even if sampling solely
cannibalizes content demand. Third, when consumers learn about content qual-
ity through inspection of the free samples, sampling has a demand-enhancing
effect when the elasticity of consumer’s posterior expectations with respect to
sample size exceeds the ratio of sampled to paid content. The optimal strategy is
determined in such a setting by the relationship between advertising effective-
ness and the interplay between prior expectations and actual content quality.
Our predictions are consistent with casual observations from the media in-
dustry.17 Once advertising effectiveness is sufficiently high, our model predicts
that the publisher should offer its entire content for free. Such a business model
was often followed in the early days of the Internet where the provision of con-
tent was largely financed by advertising. More recently, many publishers have
moved from a pure advertising-financed business model, suggesting that either
advertisers overestimated Web advertising effectiveness or that its effect has di-
minished over time.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future research. First, regarding
the consumers, we assume they correctly update quality expectations based on
their sample experience. One alternative is to assume a consistent bias in the
consumers’ judgments. In addition, in certain circumstances consumers may
adjust (discount) observed quality, assuming that the publisher has provided a
non-representative set of samples to choose from in order to persuade them to
buy the paid content. Second, one could argue that consumers do not evaluate
the qualities of all free samples because of “sampling costs.” For instance, these
costs may be due to the opportunity cost of time, mental costs, or the disutility
of advertisements. Third, one could enrich the model by allowing for compe-
tition. One way is to allow for internal competition where the publisher offers
two websites to serve different categories of consumers, which in essence relates
to the versioning literature.18 Another way is to allow for external competition
where multiple publishers compete in terms of sample size, content price, and
advertising rates. Clearly, there are many directions which research in this area
could take. We view this paper a step in this process and hope the paper en-
courages work in these and related directions.
17See, for instance, Abramson (2010).
18For instance, The Boston Globe operates the ad-supported site boston.com and the subscriber-
only site BostonGlobe.com.
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Appendix
A.1 Sampling From a Uniform Distribution
The Pareto Distribution. A random variable X has a Pareto distribution with parame-
ters w0 and α (w0 > 0 and α > 0) if X has a density
f(x|w0, α) =
{
αwα0
xα+1
for x > w0
0 otherwise.
For α > 1 the expectation of X exists and it is given by E(X) = αw0α−1 . Regarding
sampling from a uniform distribution, we use the following result.
Theorem (DeGroot, 1970).19 Suppose that X1, . . . ,Xn is a random sample from a uniform
distribution of the interval (0,W ), where the value of W is unknown. Suppose also that the
prior distribution of W is a Pareto distribution with parameters w0 and α such that w0 > 0
and α > 0. Then the posterior distribution of W when Xi = xi (i = 1, . . . , n) is a Pareto
distribution with parameters w′0 and α+ n, where w′0 = max{w0, x1, . . . , xn}.
Proof. For w > w0, the prior density function ξ of W has the following form:
ξ(w) ∝ 1
wα+1
.
Furthermore, ξ(w) = 0 for w ≤ w0. The likelihood function fn(x1, . . . , xn|w) of Xi = xi
(i = 1, . . . , n), when W = w (w > 0) is given by:20
fn(x1, . . . , xn|w) = f(x1|w) · · · f(xn|w) =
{
1
wn for max{x1, . . . , xn} < w
0 otherwise.
It follows from these relations that the posterior p.d.f. ξ(w|x1, . . . , xn) will be positive
only for values w such that w > w0 and w > max{x1, . . . , xn}. Therefore, ξ(w|·) > 0
only if w > w′0. For w > w′0, it follows from Bayes’ theorem that
ξ(w|x1, . . . , xn) ∝ fn(x1, . . . , xn|w)ξ(w) = 1
wα+n+1
(the marginal joint probability density function fn(x1, . . . , xn) of X1, . . . ,Xn is a nor-
malizing constant).
19Theorem 1, p. 172.
20GivenW = w, the random variablesX1, . . . , Xn are independent and identically distributed
and the common probability density function of each of the random variables is f(xi|w).
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The solution of problem (2) must satisfy the first-order conditions
D(p, n; V˜ (n) + (p − c) ∂D(p, n; V˜ (n))
∂p
+ λ1 = 0 (A.1)
(p− c)
(
∂D(p, n; V˜ (n))
∂n
+
∂D(p, n; V˜ (n))
∂V˜
V˜ ′(n)
)
+ a′(n)n+ a(n) + λ2 − λ3 = 0 (A.2)
and the constraints λ1p = 0, λ2n = 0, and λ3(n−N) = 0, where the λi’s are non-negative
real numbers (whose existence is assured by the Kuhn-Tucker theorem). Suppressing
the arguments of content demand, (A.1) can be rewritten as
p− c
p
=
1
ηp
(
1 +
λ1
D
)
. (A.3)
Dividing (A.2) through p and substituting from (A.3) produces
1
ηp
(
1 +
λ1
D
)(
∂D
∂n
+
∂D
∂V˜
V˜ ′(n)
)
+
a′(n)n
p
+
a(n)
p
+
λ2 − λ3
p
= 0.
Recalling that n′(a) = 1a′(n) (from the inverse function theorem) and using the defini-
tions of the respective elasticities, the preceding equation can be rearranged to obtain
pD
an
1
ηp
(
1 +
λ1
D
)(
ηn − ηV˜ V˜n
)
=
(
1− 1
ηa
)
+
λ2 − λ3
a
. (A.4)
Under a sampling strategy, there is an interior solution. Hence, the λk’s are zero and
(A.4) can be rewritten as
an
Dp
=
ηn − ηV˜ εV˜
(1− 1ηa )ηp
.
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimal decisions on size of the sample and on the price follow
from solving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions in Proposition 1.21 Under a sampling strategy,
the λk’s are zero and it follows that p∗ = NV¯ (8(2−φ)+ V¯ )/64 and n∗ = N(8φ− V¯ )/16.
Under a paid content strategy, λ1 = λ3 = 0, leading to p∗ = NV¯ /4 and n∗ = 0. Under a
free content strategy, we have that p∗ = 0 and n∗ = N .
Proof of Lemma 2. Using Lemma 1, it is straightforward to derive the profits under a
free content strategy (FC) and a paid content strategy (PC). The profits are given by,
respectively, π∗FC = (φ − 1)N and π∗PC = NV¯ /8. Comparing the two profits shows that
π∗FC ≥ π∗PC if and only if φ > V¯8 + 1.
21It is straightforward to show that the objective function is concave for all parameter values.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The profit under a sampling strategy (SC) follows from Lemma 1
and is given by π∗SC = N
(
V¯ 2 − 16V¯ (φ− 2) + 64φ2) /256. Using Lemma 2, employing
a sampling strategy is optimal if π∗SC > π
∗
PC and π
∗
SC > π
∗
FC. It is immediate that these
conditions hold if φ ∈ ( V¯8 , V¯8 + 2). A paid content strategy is optimal if π∗PC ≥ π∗SC
and π∗PC ≥ π∗FC. These conditions hold if φ ≤ V¯8 . A free content strategy is optimal if
π∗FC ≥ π∗SC and π∗FC ≥ π∗PC. These conditions hold if φ ≥ V¯8 + 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. (a) In order to calculate E [v˜0(n)] when v¯0 < V¯ , we first derive the
distribution of v˜0(n) = max{v¯0, V1, . . . , Vn}. Before doing so, we state a preliminary
fact: Let M = max{V1, . . . , Vn}. Then, the distribution function of M is given by:
FM (t) ≡ Pr{max{V1, . . . , Vn} ≤ t}
= Pr {{V1 ≤ t} ∩ . . . ∩ {Vn ≤ t}}
=
n∏
i=1
Pr {Vi ≤ t} =
(
t
V¯
)n
. (A.5)
As an immediate implication, the density function of M is given by
fM (t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
. (A.6)
Next we derive the density function of v˜0(n). By definition, v˜0(n) cannot be smaller
than v¯0. Therefore, v˜0(n) = v¯0 if and only if max{V1, . . . , Vn} ≤ v¯0. The probability of
this event follows from (A.5) and it is given by
FM (v¯0) =
( v¯0
V¯
)n
.
For v˜0(n) > v¯0, let F˜ (·) denote the truncated distribution function of v˜0(n). After remov-
ing the lower part of the distribution, we have F˜ (t) = FM (t) − FM (v¯0) for t ∈ [v¯0, V¯ ].
This implies f˜(t) = fM (t) for t ∈ [v¯0, V¯ ], and hence
f˜(t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
, if v¯0 ≤ t ≤ V¯
by (A.6). The distribution of v˜0(n) has a mixed structure with
Pr {v˜0(n) = v¯0} =
( v¯0
V¯
)n
(A.7)
and density
f˜(t) =
ntn−1
V¯ n
, if v¯0 ≤ t ≤ V¯ . (A.8)
The expectation of this mixed distribution is given by
E [v˜0(n)] = v¯0
( v¯0
V¯
)n
+
∫ V¯
v¯0
ntn
V¯
dt
=
v¯n+10 + nV¯
n+1
(n+ 1)V¯ n
.
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Substituting this expression into (10) produces (11). (b) If v¯0 ≥ V¯ , then v˜0(n) is equal
to v¯0, which in turn implies that E [v˜0(n)] = v¯0. Substituting this expression into (10)
yields (12).
Proof of Lemma 4. If v¯0 < V¯ , the quality gap can be expressed as
V˜ (n)− V¯
2
=
v¯n+10 (α+ n)− V¯ n+1(α− 1)
2(α + n− 1)(n + 1)V¯ n . (A.9)
Clearly, the sign of the quality gap depends only on the sign of numerator (A.9). The
latter can easily be rearranged to obtain (15). If v¯0 ≥ V¯ , the quality gap can be written
as
V˜ (n)− V¯
2
=
(α+ n)
(
v¯0 − V¯
)
+ V¯
2(α + n− 1) ,
which is strictly positive by our assumptions.
Proof of Lemma 5. Differentiating (16) with respect to n yields
∂DE(p, n)
∂n
=
(
(N − n)V˜ (n)′ − V˜ (n)
)
p(
(N − n)V˜ (n)
)2 .
Clearly, sampling is demand-enhancing if (N − n)V˜ ′(n) − V˜ (n) > 0, which can be
rearranged as V˜
′(n)n
V˜ (n)
> nN−n .
Proof of Lemma 6. The optimal price under a paid content strategy follows from Lemma 1
by replacing V¯ with the prior expectation αv¯0α−1 . It is then easy to derive expected profits
π∗PC =
N
4
αv¯0
2(α−1) . The profit under a free content strategy is given by π
∗
FC = (φ − 1)N .
Comparing the two profit levels immediately yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. If the reduced-form profit function πE(n) in (17) is strictly con-
cave, the optimal sample size n∗ satisfies at an interior solution the first-order condition
(N − n∗) V˜
′(n∗)
4
− V˜ (n
∗)
4
+ φ− 2n
∗
N
= 0.
For a corner solution involving n∗ = 0, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply
NV˜ ′(0)
4
− V˜ (0)
4
+ φ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ φ ≤ φ.
At the other extreme, when n∗ = N , the Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold that
− V˜ (N)
4
+ φ− 2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ φ ≥ φ.
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Proof of Lemma 7. Using the definition of V˜ (n) in (14), the lower bound can be expressed
in terms of the underlying model parameters as
φ =
(2α(α − 1) +N) v¯0
16(α − 1)2 .
Setting v¯0 = V¯ and letting α → ∞ immediately yields that φ → V¯8 . Likewise, we obtain
φ =
(α+N) V¯
8(α +N − 1) + 2.
Letting α → ∞, we obtain φ → V¯8 + 2.
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